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NOTES
CORPORATIONS-FOREIGN--SERVICE

IN

PERSONAm-TRANSACTING

BusINEss THROUGH AGENTS OR OTHER REPRESENTATIVES.-Reported
decisions of the present day abound with instances where relief has
been granted where none would have been forthcoming at the common law. This innovation is due largely to' statutory enactments involving a different philosophy of the law, a change which is only
natural, since changing conditions should entail a variation in the
administration of the law. The law dealing with corporations is
typical, for corporations were not unknown at common law, and
jurisdiction over them, particularly over foreign corporations, is especially in point. "At common law a state court has no jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation unless it voluntarily appears, except so
far as its property may be attached, and then only to the extent
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of the property attached. At common law, a state court cannot render a personal judgment against a foreign corporation, there being
no statute for service of process. Accordingly at common law a foreign
corporation could not be sued by personal service outside of the
state creating it, inasmuch as service on its officers was held insufficient. The modern view, however, is that jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation may be acquired in suits on contracts made on
business done within the jurisdiction, by service upon an officer of
the corporation, or upon an agent engaged in the state." 1 (Italics are
mine.) It is this last which brings to the fore the primary point
of discussion: Just to what extent must a foreign corporation operate
within a state so that it may be said to be "doing business" in that
state so that it will be amenable to service of process in in personam
actions? The problem and its solution, in general, have been aptly
stated: "'Questions have frequently arisen as to what constitutes
'doing business' in the state, within the meaning of the statutes relating to foreign corporations, and the answer is not always clear.
If a foreign corporation continuously does a substantial part of its
business in the state, however, little, it is within the statute. Clearly,
it does business in the state if it has an office and sells some of its
goods there. And by the better opinion a single act of its ordinary
business brings it within the statute. Thus, a corporation organized
for the purpose of lending money on real estate mortgage security
does business by making a single loan and taking a mortgage to
secure it. In like manner an insurance company would do business in
the state by issuing a single policy of insurance. Such acts constitute
the ordinary business of the company." 2
The proposition of "doing business" is of vital importance, and
may arise in different ways. It may be that a foreign corporation is
operating in the state without a license and it becomes necessary to
decide whether the organization is carrying on its activities to the
extent that it must comply with statutory requirements and to determine whether it has incurred the penalty for its failure 'to conform with such obligations. Or it may be that a person defends an
action brought against him by a foreign corporation on a contract
upon the ground that the plaintiff was not licensed to carry on business in the state and that, consequently, the contract being void, no
recovery can 'be had on it. Or it may be that the corporation is the
defendant in such an action and is contesting the service of process
upon it within the state, claiming it was not transacting business
1 4 Coox, CORPORATIONS (8th ed.) 3336.
2

CLARK, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1897) 623.

"When a foreign corporation transacts some substantial part of its ordinary
business in a state, it is doing, transacting, carrying on, or engaging in business
therein, within the meaning of the statutes under consideration." CORPORATIONS,
14A C. J. 1270, and cases cited.
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within that particular political subdivision to the extent that service
was valid. A recent example of the latter problem is found in the
Michigan case of Malooly v. York Heating & Ventilating Corporation.3 In this instance, the plaintiffs, engaged in the wholesale meat
business in Detroit, had made negotiations with the York Company,
a Pennsylvania corporation, regarding the installation of a refrigeration system in their place of business. Despite the defendants' claim,
the evidence showed conclusively that the units were purchased
directly from the defendant corporation, and were installed under
the supervision of York and McConnor, the latter being the Detroit
sales representative of York. Because of some undiscoverable defect,
the system never was satisfactory, and this suit was brought to recover damages for losses sustained from spoiled meats, loss of business, rental of the premises, and the cost of replacement of equipment. The defendant corporation appeared specially and moved to set
aside the service of summons which had been made upon McConnor,
but the motion was denied. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court, one of
the eight judges dissenting, after deciding that service upon the agent
was good, held that since the plaintiffs dealt directly with the corporation and since under the contract the title to the machinery was
to remain in the corporation until full payment made, and as McConnor was in the state, not only for the purpose of securing business for
his principal, but also to serve his employers in the installation and
operation of the equipment, the corporation was "doing business" in
the state within the meaning of the statute, and hence was amenable
to the service of process. Aside from this case, that the settling of
the question is of great consequence will be seen from the following:
.. . it is well-settled that to give the local courts jurisdiction in personam in an action against a foreign corporation, it is essential that
the corporation be doing business in the state or appear in the action.
The doing of business which will render such corporation amenable
must occur at the time of service and not before; attempted service
of summons on a foreign corporation not doing business in the state
is invalid, for it is too well-settled to require extended citation of
authority that the courts of a state cannot acquire jurisdiction of an
action at law or suit in equity against a foreign corporation, so as to
render a personal judgment against it, unless the corporation comes
within the jurisdiction of the state, so that process may be served
upon it, or unless it voluntarily appears and submits to the jurisdic"tion, nor can state statutes provide otherwise.... it is essential to the
legal rendition of a personal judgment against a foreign corporation,
otherwise than by its voluntary appearance, that the corporation be
doing business within the state." 4
3

258 N. W. 622 (Mich. 1935).

4

18 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1933)

§ 8643.
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Despite the large number of decisions that pertain to the point in
hand, it is a much harder task to determine when a corporation is doing business in a state than to decide when it is not. "There is no
precise test of the nature or extent of the business that must be done
in order to constitute 'doing business.' All that is requisite is that
enough business be done to enable the court to say that the corBut it is not any business activity
poration is present in the state ....
of a foreign corporation which will justify the conclusion that it
is 'doing business' in a district other than that of its residence, so as
to make it amenable to service of process there; the transaction of
business must be such that the corporation is for the time being within
the state in which it is sued." 5 To enumerate a few of the activities
which have been held to constitute doing, transacting, carrying on, or
engaging in business in a state, we have: the making of loans, 6 the
carrying on of a real estate brokerage business, 7 the making of contracts to furnish theatrical entertainments,8 the management and opera,tion of a manufacturing plant, 9 the taking of orders by an agent, subject to the approval of a foreign corporation at its office outside the
state, 10 the buying and selling of goods by an authorized agent of a
Russian corporation in New York," the installation of a sprinkler
system involving the employment of labor for weeks, building of tower,
tank, and other carpenter work, excavating and filling of trenches,
and use of material on the ground and property of a manufacturing
company. 12 But, on the other hand, engaging in litigation does not
constitute doing business in the state,' 3 nor does the collection of debts
by the foreign corporation due it for goods sold or otherwise contracted amount to such. 14 Likewise, the appointment of agents to transact business in the state in the future is not regarded as doing business.15 Neither does the performance of such acts as the submitting of
bids on work to be performed in a state and the entering into a contract to perform such work constitute "doing business" so as to render the contract void for the corporation's failure to comply with
statutory regulations.' 6
op. dt. supra note 4, at § 8713.
5 FLn=CH,
6 People's Building, Loan and Savings Ass'n v. Markley, 27 Ind. App. 128,

60 N. E. 1013 (1901).
Warren v. Interstate Realty Co., 192 II1. App. 438 (1915).
8 Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 161 S. W. 488 (1913).
9 Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611 (1903).
10 Vicksburg, S. & P. Railway v. DeBow, 148 Ga. 738, 98 S. E. 381 (1919).
11 Hunau v. Northern Region Supply Corporation, 262 Fed. 181 (S. D. N. Y.
1920).
12 U. S. Construction Co. v. Hamilton Nat. Bank of Ft. Wayne, Indiana,
73 Ind. App. 149, 126 N. E. 866 (1920)
13 Smith v. Little, 67 Ind. 549 (1879).
14 Woodall v. People's Nat. Bank, 153 Ala. 576, 45 So. 194 (1907).
15 Hallowell v. Smith Agricultural Chemical Co., 41 Ind. App. 361, 83 N. E.
772 (1907).
16 Hogan v. City of St. Louis, 176 Mo. 149, 75 S. W. 604 (1903).
7

NOTES
In Hogan v. City of St. Louis 17 the Kern Company, a codefendant,
was a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, and it was
without authority to do business in Missouri; it submitted a bid on a
street lighting project and was awarded the contract. A suit in equity
was brought by a taxpayer of St. Louis to enjoin the city, its officers,
and the Kern Company from performing the contract on the ground
that the contract was void, having been made with a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the state. The Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the complainant's contention was not supportable,
.stating, with reference to the foreign corporation: "It is not bound to
establish itself here before it can obtain such a contract. Entering into
a contract like the one in question undoubtedly is 'transacting business' within the unlimited meaning of the term, but that is not the
sense in which the term is used in the statute. .

.

. As there used, it

means carrying on the work for which the corporation was organized,
and in its application to the facts of this case, it means performing
the work called for by the contract. The Kern Company . .. had the
right to enter into the contract in question, and we hold it to be a
legal and valid contract." 17 In like manner, a foreign corporation
holding the majority of the stock of a domestic corporation is not
thereby doing business in the state, it making no effort to control or
manage the domestic company; 1 8 but there is a conflict of views as to
whether the sale of corporate stock by a foreign corporation is the
exercise of a corporate function constituting the doing of business
19
withinthe state in which the sale is made.
As intimated above, the phrase "doing business" has different implications. When taken in connection with the question as to whether a
corporation is amenable to process, a different cqnstruction is given to
the term than is given when it is used with respect to the tax and qualifying statutes; 20 in the former ingtance, a much narrower interpretation is employed.2 1 The determination of the question as to whether a
foreign corporation is doing business within a state so as to be sub17 Op. cit. supra note 16. See CORPORATiONS, 14A C. J. 1275-92, for other
and similar examples of operations not regarded in the category of "doing
business."
18 State v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 263 S. W. 319 (Tex. 1924).
19 Meir v. Crossley, 264 S. W. 882, 35 A. L. R. 611 (Mo. 1924) (Expressing
the majority rule and holding that such activity is not carrying on business.).
Contra: Jones v. Martin, 15 Ala. App. 6.75, 74 So. 761 (1917). See Annotation, 35 A. L. R. 626, 634, for the majority and minority rules respectively and
cases there cited.
20 "It should be remembered, we are not defining the term 'doing b.'siness'
for the purpose of determining whether the defendant York is taxable or subject to the qualifying laws of this state, but only for the purpose of determining
its amenability to service of process." Bushnell, J., in Malooly v. York Heating
& Ventilating Corp., op. cit. supra note 3, at 625.
21 Cf. FLET.cnz, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 8712.
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ject to suit therein is often a matter of great difficulty. In seeking an
answer the courts have enumerated certain general principles, but no
hard and fast rule has been established. "It is stated generally that to
render a foreign corporation subject to the jurisdiction of a state, the
;business done by the company in the state must be of such a character
and extent as to warrant the inference that the company has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the state." 22 No standards
as to the nature or extent of the business that must be done are set
by the states which follow this rule; 23 it is sufficient if enough work
be done so that the court may conscientiously say that the corporation
is present in the state, and that the work be a part of its ordinary busi24
ness transactions for which it was organized.
Going a little further, there are some jurisdictions which hold that
it is necessary that the foreign corporation transact a substantial portion of its ordinary business in the state. 25 "The question as to what
kind of business by a foreign corporation within a state will -justify
a finding that it is engaged in business therein, and validate a service
upon its agent, has been very thoroughly and elaborately discussed in
the circuit courts of the United States, and the general consensus of
opinion is that the corporation must transact within the state some
substantial part of its ordinary business by its officers or agents appointed and selected for that purpose, and that the transaction of an
isolated business act is not the carrying on or doing business in a
state." 28 In the case of Frontier S. S. Co. v. Franklin S. S. Co.27 the
defendant, a foreign corporation, during and prior to the year 1915,
was owner of several vessels engaged in transporting merchandise
on the Great Lakes, and operated a line of ships carrying cargoes in
interstate commerce to and from Buffalo, coming to this port periodically during the season of navigation. At this place freights were collected by local agents, crews paid off, and vessels fitted out, repaired,
or laid up for the winter, as necessary, all of this being done within
the jurisdiction of the court. It was held, on motion to quash service
of summons, that the defendant was at the time "transacting business"
within the state, and that service upon an officer was good even though
22 CORPoRAnONS, 14A C. J. 1372; Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., 242 Fed.
543 (S. D. Cal. 1917); Smithson v. Roneo, 231 Fed. 349 (E. D. N. Y. 1916);

People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, Ann. Cas. 1918C,
537 (1918). See, also, Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 I11. 99,
124 N. E. 355 (1919), and cases there cited.
28 Tanza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
24 Booz v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 250 Ill. 376, 95 N. E. 460 (1911).
25 Jameson v. Simonds Saw Co., 2 Cal. App. 582, 84 Pac. 289 (1906); Painter
v. Colorado Springs & Cripple Creek Dist. Ry. Co., 127 Mo. App. 248, 104 S. W.
1139 (1907); Doctor v. Desmond, 80 N. J. Eq. 77, 82 AtI. 522 (1912).
26 Hawley, J., in Doe v. Springfield Boiler Mfg. Co., 104 Fed. 684 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900).
27 233 Fed. 127 (W. D. N. Y. 1916).
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none of the vessels happened to be in port at the time of serving the
writ. Another group of courts, "while recognizing that the transaction
of a substantial portion of the business of the corporation by authorized agents in the state is sufficient to render the corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state, hold that it is not necessary that the transactions in the state of the foreign corporation shall
be the performance of those particular acts which constitute the characteristic feature of the business for which it was organized, or that
the chief or principal part of the business of the corporation shall be
transacted in the state." 28 In the case Pomeroy v. Hocking Valley
Railway Company 20 an Ohio corporation, which had never obtained
permission to do business in New York and had its property and
principal office entirely outside the state, maintaining no business
agents within the state, but renting an office in the state, holding meetings of its board of directors therein and there keeping the office of its
secretary who conducted correspondence and transfers of stock in such
office, was held to be doing 'business within the state so that service
of a civil summons on such corporation by delivery to such secretary
was valid. Despite their disagreements as to the 6haracter of the work,
the courts are practically unanimous to the effect that a single isolated
act or transaction does not constitute a doing of business within the
state.8 0 The course of business must be continuous, not absolutely so,
bui sufficiently so as to take it out of the realm of casual transactions.8 '
There are, however, a. few jurisdictions which hold that intermittent
business, or even a single act or transaction, may be sufficient to render
the corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the courts as to the
business actually done in the state.3 2 There are several other considerations with regard to jurisdiction in an action in personam. First of
all, it is generally concededthat the presence of an officer or agent of
the corporation in the state and engaged in the business of the corporation brings the coiporation within the jurisdiction of the courts
28

29

J. 1373.
218 N: Y. 530, 113 N. E. 504 (1916).
CoRPORATIONs, 14A C.

30 Jameson v. Simonds Saw Co., op. cit. supra note 25 (Writing letter accepting offer of services.); Doctor v. Desmond, op. cit. supra note 25 (Voting of stock

owned by the foreign corporation in a domestic corporation.); Crook v. Girard
Iron & Metal Co., 87 Md. 138, 39 AUt. 94, 67 Am. St. Rep. 325 (1898) (Purchase
of personalty at a sheriff's sale.).
"The words [doing business] as used in the various statutes refer to the
general transaction of business, and not to an isolated transaction, without the
intention of continuing business." ELoTT, THE LAw or PaxvATE CoaPoA~iONs
(4th ed.) 338, 339.
81 Rich v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 34 Wash. 14, 74 Pac. 1008 (1904);
Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co., op. cit. supra note 22.
32 Colorado Iron Works v. Sierra Grande Mining Co., 15 Colo. 499, 25
Pac. 325, 22 Am. St. Rep. 433 (1890) (Contracting a debt.); Brooks v. Nevada
Nickel Syndicate, 24 Nev. 311, 53 Pac. 597 (1898)
a mortgage as security.).

(Loaning money and taking
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of the state. 83 Secondly, where a corporation goes into another state
,and there establishes a place of business from which, by means of its
authorized agents, its business is transacted, it must be regarded as
within that jurisdiction for purposes of suit. Finally, the time of doing
business is of great importance. It is the rule in the federal courts
and in a few of the states that in order that jurisdiction in personam
be acquired over a foreign corporation, such corporation must be
present in the state or doing business in the state at the time of service
of process. 3 4 In other states, a foreign corporation, even though it has
withdrawn and has ceased to do business within the state, is still subject to service of process and suit on causes of action already accrued
on contracts made in the state, but not on causes of action which
arose subsequently to withdrawal from the state.3 5
The scope of the problem can be seen from the foregoing discussion. Decisions on the point are numerous, and they are not all in
accord. Some of the opposing decisions are irreconcilable, and the
only explanation lies in the wording of the various statutes and in the
interpretation of the facts. Such being the case, it would be a difficult
and profitless task, for purposes here, to list such decisions, and in the
absence of a set rule, the following must suffice: "The general rule to
be adduced from the better considered and majority of a multitude of
cases involving the question when is a foreign corporation 'doing
business,' 'carrying on,' 'transacting,' or 'engaged in,' business in a
state,--the phraseology affording but slight ground for distinction,is that such is the case only when some substantial part of its ordinary
business is conducted within the jurisdiction; single acts, or occasional
and sporadic acts, or acts relating to the internal affairs of the corporation, not usually being regarded as falling within the operation of the
rule." 86
Ric ard A. Molique.

.3 "According to the general rule, the service upon a foreign corporation
can only be made upon an agent who is representing a corporation which is
engaged in business in the state. The corporation must he in 'the state for the
purpose of doing business, and it is not enough that the agent or representative
of the corporation is simply within the limits of the state. This doctrine is too
well established to require the citation of many authorities." ELLroIT, Op. ct.
supra note 30, at 356.
34 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); Golden,
Belknap & Swartz v. Connersville Wheel Co., 252 Fed. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1918);
International Cotton-Seed Oil Co. v. Wheelock, 124 Ala. 367, 27 So. 517 (1900);
Carpenter v. Bradford, 23 Cal. App. 560, 138 Pac. 946 (1913).
35 Groel v. United Electric Co. of New Jersey, 69 N. J. Eq. 397, 60 Atl. 822
(1905); Gerrick & Gerrick Co. v. Llewellyn Iron works, 177 Pac. 692 (Wash.
1919).
86 Annotation, 35 A. L. R. 625, 626.

NOTES
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-In Gillespie v.
Loge' the Appellate Court of Ohio was presented with a case on appeal growing out of an action in partition filed by Clara Gillespie, one
of the devisees under the will of Anna Kaufmann. The executor and
devisees under the will were made parties defendant, among whom
was Lillian Adams. This defendant filed an answer and cross-petition
in the case in which she set up claim to the fee of three parcels of
land under an oral contract claimed to have been entered into with
the deceased, Mrs. Kaufmann, whereby it was agreed that, in consideration of Lillian Adams living with deceased and caring for her
during her life, and performing other services, the deceased would
convey to her the above mentioned property. Lillian Adams had
lived in the Kaufmann household since childhood but on becoming
married had established a home of her own. Later the couple were
asked to live again with Anna Kaufmann without compensation and
a written agreement was drawn up giving either party the right to
withdraw from the agreement. Lillian Adams and her husband took
advantage of this provision and left the home of Anna Kaufmann. To
induce them to return Anna Kaufmann orally contracted to convey
to them certain real estate-this is the oral promise in question. The
Adamses again became dissatisfied and were moving out when Anna
Kaufmann hurriedly caused the power of attorney to be drawn up.
The validity and legal effect of this instrument is discussed more fully
later on in this note. Let it suffice to say that the power of attorney
was insufficient under the law to empower the attorney to convey
the lands after the death of Anna Kaufmann. Soon after her death
the action in partition concerning seventeen parcels of real estate
was started, and the present cross-petition was filed by Lillian Adams.
After a perusal of the facts it is evident that three major propositions or questions confronted the Appellate Court of Ohio. The first
of these may be stated thus: Will performance of a contract to provide personal and domestic services merit specific performance of the
promise to convey real estate in consideration therefor?
There have been numerous cases on this point. In a leading Nebraska case 2 a girl about seventeen months old was given by her
parents to her uncle and aunt under an agreement that they would
adopt her, and rear, nurture and educate her, and that she was to
be as their own child, and at their death to receive or be left all the
property which they might own. She lived with them until they
died, some ten years afterwards but the title to the property which
they owned at their death was never transferred to the child, either
by will or deed. The Nebraska court held that there was such performance of the contract by the party plaintiff as entitled her to a
1

194 N. E. 376 (Ohio 1934).

2 Kofka v. Rosicky, 59 N. W. 788, 25 L. R. A. 207 (Neb. 1894).
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decree giving her the title to the property by way of specific performance. This decision has been followed in Nebraska since 1894
and is the case establishing the equitable doctrine in that State in
force today.
A question almost identical with the instant case arose on appeal
before the Michigan court in 1913.3 The plaintiff had orally agreed
to manage the farm and care for the defendant, an aged lady, until
her death. In return the defendant promised to convey certain real
estate to the plaintiff. The court, in holding for the plaintiff, avoided
the question of the statute of frauds with seemingly studied care
and held that since the plaintiff had shown the contract with unusual clarity, its acceptance and performance by himself, and the
enjoyment -of its beneficial provisions by the deceased during a long
series of years, equity demanded its specific performance.
In Gordon v. Spelman 4 it was held that an oral contract to devise land falls within the statute of frauds. This is a uniform rule
established by all courts. But it was also decided that where a party
in whose favor the will is to be made has performed his part of the
contract, and the other party dies leaving a will in which no devise is
made pursuant to the oral contract to devise land, then the performing
party may, in a proper case, apply to a court of equity for specific performance.
Further exposition of this equitable doctrine is found in the interesting case of Lang v. Chase,5 where evidence was presented which
showed an oral agreement between the plaintiff and the intestate,
whereby the former was to receive half of the latter's property for
caring for the intestate during his life. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to charge the estate with a trust. The court did not
act upon the ground that it had the power to compel the actual
execution of a will but rather the court proceeded to construe the
agreement only as binding the property so as to fasten or impress a
trust on it in favor of the promisee.
These few cases illustrate the tendency of many courts to allow
specific performance of oral contracts to convey or devise real property in return for personal services rendered. However, there is authority to the contrary. Some courts have flatly refused to convey
title to land as the result of a decree of specific performance. Others
have declined to specifically enforce such contracts because the part
or full performance of the contract was not considered sufficient to
take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds, or because of
adequacy of consideration, or because conditions and circumstances
were such as to render a decree of specific performance inequitable.
3 Howe v. Benedict, 142 N. W. 768 (Mich. 1913).
145 Ga. 682, 89 S. E. 749, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 852 (1916).
5 155 Atl. 273 (Me. 1931).

4

NOTES
In Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Sckuerbrock 6 the court said: "It
is well-established in this State that an oral agreement to devise lands
is not taken out of the statute by the performance of services in
reliance upon it, although they be of a personal nature. . . .Upon
principle, the same rule must apply to a contract to convey, and
such is the great weight of authority except in those cases where a
denial of the right to specific performance would operate as a hardship and fraud upon the party claiming the right."
To illustrate the recognized dangers resulting from the misapplication of this equitable principle we quote with approval from Kinney
v. Murray 7 the following: "When .. . a court of equity is called
upon to establish and enforce a contract . . . in the teeth of the
statute of wills and of the statute of frauds and perjuries, and to set
aside the disposition of valuable property made in conformity with
the requirements of these statutes, there is devolved upon the Chancellor the gravest responsibility, perhaps, that ever attaches to his
high office. And nothing short of the inherent justice of the claim,
supported by evidence that can be relied upon with the utmost confidence, proving the existence of the [oral] contract, its terms and
conditions, and a substantial and meritorious compliance therewith,
with such certainty and definiteness as to leave no room for reasonable doubt, can ever justify the exercise of such an extraordinary
prerogative." (Italics are mine.)
The above statement of the Missouri court is the true basis for the
intervention of equity to decree specific performance of an oral contract to convey or devise property in return for personal services.
Although some states, such as Wisconsin,8 have not adopted the rule
that performance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt,
nevertheless upon reason and authority the rule ought not to be
further relaxed. 9
The memorandum referred to in the early part of this discussion
was as follows:
"November 4, 1926.
"Mr. Cliff Brown: As my attorney I direct you to at my death deed
to Albert Heimert, the lot on Central Av., Lockland. I purchased
from Dollman and deed to Lillian Adams these properties known
as the Goodwin, Griffen and Carson, all of which are located on Mill
Street, Lockland. As payment in full for services rendered my husband, Joseph Kaufmann, and myself during our lifetime.
"Anna Kaufmann."
6 217 N. W. 416, 419 (Wis. 1928).
7 170 Mo. 700, 71 S. W. 197, 202 (1902).
8 Marshall & haley Bank v. Schuerbrock, op. cit. supra note 6.
9 5 POamoys EQUIry J RisPRUDENCE (4th ed.) §§ 2248, 2252.
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The second important question in the present case is whether the
above memorandum was sufficient to take the promise to convey real
estate out of the statute of frauds, it being insufficient as a power
of attorney after her death.
The form of the writing is immaterial according to the prevailing view. A memorandum wholly untechnical in form may be sufficient.10 The description of the property here was adequate as it
describes the land to be conveyed in such fashion as to render possible
the location of it, and the determination of its condition and appearance
for the purpose of identification. The necessity for such a description
is illustrated in Jackson v. Stearns," where it was held that letters
passing between an alleged vendor and vendee cannot be read together to constitute a contract for the sale of (or conveyance) of real
estate, if they do not identify the land which is intended to be the
subject matter of the contract, as to which there is a dispute, so that
parol evidence would be required to substantiate the truth of the
matter.
The memorandum capable of taking the contract out of the statute
of frauds must state the consideration or at least a consideration for
the promise of the defendant. The necessity for a statement of con-2
sideration is set out in the Note accompanying Tagger v. Hunter,1
where it is said that "In most jurisdictions the rule is laid down that
in a contract which is within the statute of frauds the failure to
state a price or consideration . . . will render the contract fatally

defective." The memorandum here complies with this provision.
The memorandum was signed and executed by Anna Kaufmann
thus fulfilling this requirement. The fact that the writing was intended for some other purpose does not prevent its being a sufficient
memoradum to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds.' 3
The Ohio court did not find it absolutely necessary, in the principal
case, to declare the memorandum sufficient to take the contract out
of the statute of frauds because there was sufficient performance to
validate the agreement. The court, however, did say that "if necessary to support the contract there must be a memorandum, we are
of the opinion that the memorandum is sufficient to satisfy the statute." In summary then, a memorandum possessed of no definite
form, but setting out the description of the property, the consideration involved, the parties interested, and itself being signed is sufficient to take an oral contract to convey land out of the statute of
frauds.
There remains one more question presented by the instant decision. Can domestic services rendered over a period of years be asSingleton v. Hill, 64 N. W. 588, 51 Am. St. Rep. 868 (Wis. 1895).
113 Pac. 30 (Ore. 1911).
12 Note, Ann. Cas. 1818A, 134, 135.
13 First Presbyterian Church v. Swanson, 100 111.App. 39 (1901).
10

11
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certained with reasonable certainty so as to give an adequate remedy
at law in -an action on quantum rneruit? The rule .isthat where
services performed can be adequately compensated at law, or where
the promisee shows no substantial -change for the worse in his position in consequence of the agreement, specific performance will be
denied. 14 'In a very recent Illinois case,15 the remedy at law was
declared, to be inadequate because of the impossibility of ascertaining damages incurred by the plaintiff when, in reliance upon decedent's oral promise to convey land to him, he gave up his own
home, "carried out his part of the agreement without compensation,
rendered services over a period of practically three years which impaired his health, and exposed him to a resulting financial detriment.
It was held that -the damages could not be ascertained so as to give
the plaintiff a cause of action in quantum meruit.
The companionship and family relationship extended to Anna
Kaufmann in the instant case was valuable, and, under the facts, is
not compensable in money damages in an hction at law. "The general equity rule is that the value of intimate ompanionship and
personal care and attention, such as is common among members of a
family living together, cannot be measured in money so as to be recoverable in an action at law." 16 The Minnesota court has perhaps
gone as far as any of the courts in so holding.17 In the instant case
he services were rendered over a nine year period. They consisted
of commercial services, companionship, bookkeeping, serving, dressing and undressing, bathing, cleaning, clerking, making wearing apparel, nursing, giving advice, looking after the real estate, and collecting rents. It would hardly be possible to gauge the value of these
services to the decedent, Anna Kaufmann. Specific performance is
essential in the present case to prevent the commission of a fraud.
The instant case is in accord with the prevailing view as to the
specific performance of oral contracts to convey or devise land. The
facts present an exceptionally strong case as the courts will usually
decree specific performance when the agreement is partly performed,
that alone being sufficient, while here the memorandum, although
intended for another purpose, was sufficient to take the contract out
of the statute.
In the last analysis, the equity court attaches its jurisdiction on
the ground of fraud in a case such as the present; not an antecedent
fraud in entering into the contract, but a fraud inhering in the consequence of setting up the statute as a defense. "If the defendant
knowingly permits the plaintiff to do acts in part performance of
the verbal agreement, acts done in reliance on the agreement, which
'4
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Yager v. Lyons, 337 Ill.
271, 169 N. E. 222 (1929).
Fierke v. Elgin City Banking Co., 194 N. E. 528 (I. 1935).
Happel v. Happel, 238 N. W. 783, 784 (Minn. 1931).
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changes the relations of the parties and prevent a restoration
to their former condition, it would be a virtual fraud for the defendant to interpose the statute as a defense, and thus to secure for
himself the benefit of the acts of part performance, while the plaintiff would be left not only without adequate remedy at law, but also
liable for damages as a trespasser." 18 It follows from this, of course,
that the acts of part performance must be done by the party seeking
to enforce the contract, the acts must be done in pursuance of the
contract, with the idea in mind of executing that contract, and with
the consent, express or implied, or knowledge of the other party.
The doctrine has been subjected to severe criticism on the grounds
that it openly violates the statute of frauds and opens the door to
frequent and flagrant abuses. It is a departure from the statute and
a few courts openly have stated that "equity will make the case an
exception to the statute," 19 although the majority of the courts
have seemingly been loath to term it an exception. Whether or not
the statute of frauds is to be used as a sword in the commission of
a fraud, or whether it is to be available as a shield to prevent it
has proved a perplexing question. The majority of the courts today, however, apply the statute so as to attain the latter result. Such
an application is undoubtedly the more equitable and expedient as
long as kept within bounds but it is submitted that only the clearest
and most convincing case should warrant a decree of specific performance, and that further relaxation of the rule should be frowned
upon by the equity courts.
John J. Locker, Jr.

TRUSTS-ESTABLISHMENT

AND ENFORCEMENT

OF TRUST-RIGHT

FoLLow TRUST PROPERTY OR PROCEEDS THEREOF-IDENTIFICATION
oF PROPERTY.-In a recent Pennsylvania case, In re Gordon,' the plaintiff employed the Manayunk Trust Company to act as her agent in
selling a mortgage for her. The Trust Company sold the mortgage to
one Alexander for $1,524.50. Alexander had a deposit account with
the Trust Company at the time, and the purchase price of the mortgage
was debited to this deposit account and credited to a miscellaneous
account for the purpose of setting it aside for the plaintiff. The Trust
Company then drew a check on the miscellaneous account payable to
the plaintiff, and sent it to her. Before the plaintiff had an opportunity
to cash the check the bank closed. The plaintiff sought a preference
over the general creditors for the amount of the check. At all times
To
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4 Pomaoy's EQUITY JuRzsPRuDENcE (4th ed.) § 1409.

Happel v. Happel, op. cit. supra note 16, at 785.
176 Ad. 52 (Pa. 1934).
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from the payment of the $1,524.50 by Alexander until the dosing of
the Trust Company there was a greater credit in the miscellaneous account than the amount of the check. The court held that the Trust
Company acted wrongfully in failing to keep the money collected for the
plaintiff separate from its other funds, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a preference over the general creditors. The court said: "In
the case at bar, the money was not deposited in the general funds of
the bank, but, as stated, in a 'Miscellaneous Account.' The money
received by the trust company was readily traced to this particular account. There was no trouble in identifying or locating it, and there was
sufficient money in that special account to pay the appellant." There
is a vigorous dissenting opinion in the case in which the view is taken
that this was merely a bookkeeping transaction and no trust could be
established by it.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, for the eighth circuit,
had a somewhat similar case before it in Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour
& Feed Co. 2 There the plaintiff sent a draft for $1,113.75, drawn on
Emil Anderson, to the First National Bank of Forest City, Iowa, for
collection. Anderson paid this draft by check against his account in
the Forest City Bank. The bank charged the amount of the check to
Anderson's account, and drew a draft on the Federal Reserve Bank
payable to the plaintiff for the amount collected. The Forest City
Bank become insolvent before this draft was paid. The court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to a preference over'the general creditors
for the amount collected, saying: "As to this branch of the case the
recent decisions of this court in Larabee Flour Mills v. First National
Bank of Henryetta, Okla., and Farmers' National Bank of Burlington,
Kan. v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., decided June 12, 1926, and reported
as one case in 13 F. (2d) 330, are squarely in point. In a similar
state of facts it was there said: 'It is difficult to explain or understand
by what equitable right one who has not contributed to the creation
of a fund should be given a special and superior interest therein,
though some of the state courts seem to so hold. The collecting banks
acted as agents (Commercial Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 S.
Ct. 533, 37 L. Ed. 363), and had they collected and retained the
funds called for by the drafts, as was their duty on account of insolvency, the equities of claimants would be plain; but, instead of doing so, they merely shifted credits on their books and records. No
part of the funds in the bank when they failed was placed there by
claimants, or by anyone for them. In each case the draft was paid by
check on the insolvent. No additional funds were brought into the
bank by either transaction. If the drafts which they held for collection
had been paid in currency or by check on some other bank, the insolvents' assets would have been increased that much, when thereafter their remittance drafts were dishonored; and in that event equity
2

26 Fed. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
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would have regarded the collections as trust funds, followed them into
the increased assets, and to the extent of the increase applied them
first in discharge of these claims. This is our conception of the rule
and the reason for it, applied in the federal courts. It has been repeatedly announced by this court.'"
It is the purpose of this note to consider whether there is a sufficient distinction between the facts of these two cases to justify the
contrary results, and to consider what, on principle, should be the result in such cases. It is often stated that where a trustee wrongfully
converts trust money or property into some other form of property
the cestui que trust may follow it and recover it in its new form as
long as he can identify it as the product of the original trust prop-

erty.3 James Barr Ames states the rule as follows: 4 "If a trustee wrong-

fully sells the trust-res or exchanges it for other property, the cestui
que trust may charge him as a constructive trustee of the money or
newly acquired property, or of any subsequent product of either; or,
if he prefers, he may enforce an equitable lien to the amount of the
misappropriation upon any property in the hands of the wrongdoer,
which is the traceable product of the original trust-res."
Thus, let us suppose that a trustee wrongfully takes $1,000 of trust
money and purchases a tract of land with it. If the land increases in
value from $1,000 to $2,000 while in the hands of the trustee the
5
cestui is entitled, nevertheless, to recover the whole tract of land. It
is against the policy of the law to permit a trustee to profit by his
breach of trust.6 For this reason the cestui may have a constructive
trust impressed upon the whole tract. If the land decreases in value
from $1,000 to $500 while in the hands of the trustee, the cestui may
enforce an equitable lien upon the property to the extent of its value,
and recover a personal judgment against the trustee for the deficiency.1
s Pearce v. Dill, 149 Ind. 136, 48 N. E. 788 (1897); Harrigan v. Gilchrist,
121 Wis. 127, 99 N. W. 909 (1904) ; Bevans v. Murray, 251 Ill. 603, 96 N. E. 546
(1911).
AzmEs, LEcTuRs ON L:AL HISTORY 412.
5 Kemp v. Elmer Co., 56 Fed. (2d) 657 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1932); Small
v. Hockensmith, 158 Ala. 234, 48 So. 541 (1908); Shaler v. Trowbridge, 28 N. J2.
Eq. 595 (1877); Fur & Wool Trading Co., Ltd., v. Fox, Inc., 245 N. Y. 215,
4

156 N. E. 670 (1927); Spencer v. Pettit, 2 S. W. (2d) 422 (Comm'n of App. of
Tex. 1928).
6 In Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 59 L. ed. 151, 35 S. Ct. 77 (1914),

the court said: "It is a well settled rule that a trustee can make no profit out
of his trust. The rule in such cases springs from his duty to protect the interests
of the estate, and not to permit his personal interest to any wise conflict with his
duty in that respect. The intention is to provide against any possible selfish interest
exercising an influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty
which is owing in a fiduciary capacity."
7 Citizens Bank of Paso Robles v. Rucker, 138 Cal. 606, 72 Pac. 46 (1903);
Hinsey v. Supreme Lodge K. of P., 138 Ill.
App. 248 (1908), aff'd, 241 I. 384,
89 N. E. 728 (1908); In re Mendel's Will, 164 Wis. 136, 159 N. W. 806 (1916);
Aaaas, op. cit. supra note 4, at 412, 413.
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We come now to the case where the trustee wrongfully mixes trust
property with his own property. Suppose, for example, that a trustee
takes $1,000 of trust money and $1,000 of his own money and purchases a tract of land with the $2,000. If the property increases in
value to $3,000 in the hands of the trustee the cestui may have a
constructive trust imposed to the extent of a one-half interest in the
land, recovering land of a value of $1,500.8 If the property decreases
to a value of $1,000 the cestui may assert an equitable lien upon the
land to the extent of its full value.9 In other words, where a trustee
wrongfully mixes trust money or property with other money or property of the same nature so that the identity of the trust property is
lost, the cestui may charge, him as a constructive trustee of such a
proportion of the mass as the trust property bears to the entire mass;
or he may assert an equitable lien upon the mass to the extent of the
value of the trust property.
A similar case arises where a bank wrongfully receives money on
general deposit, as where it receives public funds on deposit from a
public officer who has no authority to make the deposit. Let us suppose that the public officer wrongfully deposits $1,000 in the bank.
The bank wrongfully mixes this $1,000 with its other cash on hand.
The bank becomes a trustee when this wrongful mixing takes place
in the proportion that $1,000 bears to the entire amount of cash in
the bank. 10 In the event of the insolvency of the bank the depositor
would be entitled to a preference as long as the amount of cash on
hand in the bank from the time of the creation of the trust until the
time of insolvency was equal to or greater than $1,000. The trustee
would be entitled to assert an equitable lien on the cash fund to the
amount of his money wrongfully deposited in the fund.' If, however,
8 Primeau v. Granfield, 184 Fed. 480, 482 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911); Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 194 N. W. 548
(1923); City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb. 822, 90 N. W. 905, 57 L. R. A.
885 (1902).
9 Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 U. S. 19, 57 L. ed. 1047, 33 S. Ct. 6(10 (1913);
Bowling v. Bank of New Haven, 219 Ky. 731, 294 S. W. 499 (1927); In re
Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1878) ; AmsEs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 413, 414;
Scott, The Right to Follow Money Mingled with Other Money, 27 H.av..L.
REV. 125, 126.

10 City of Centralia v. United States Nat. Bank, 221 Fed. 755 (W. D. Wash.
1915); State to Use of Prairie County v. McKee, 168 Ark. 441, 270 S. V. 513
(1925); Fire & Water Commissioners v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 655, 78 N.

V.

893, 44 L. R. A. 893 (1899).
The same result follows when a bank receives a deposit when it knows it is
insolvent. In re Silver, 208 Fed. 797 (N. D. Ohio 1912); Furber v. Dane, 204 Mass.
412, 90 N. E. 859, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 808 (1910).
11 Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Blair v. Hill,
50 App. Div. 33, 63 N. Y. S. 670 (1900); State v. McKinley County Bank, 32
N. M. 147, 252 Pac. 980 (1927); Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N. E. 214,
L. R. A. 1916C 6 (1912).
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the cash fund is reduced at some time to $500 the cestui can assert
a lien or receive a preference only to the amount of $500;12 this is
true even though the cash on hand at the time the bank is closed is
more than $1,000.18
Some courts, especially in the western states, have held that where
a trustee wrongfully converts trust money or property to his own use
to the general benefit of his estate, the cestui will be given a preference over the general creditors of the trustee even though the trust
property cannot be traced into any particular piece of property or
fund in the hands of the trustee. 14 In Meyers v. Board of Education 15
a treasurer of a board of education wrongfully deposited public money
in a bank of which he was manager. The bank funds later became reduced to an amount less than the amount of public money deposited.
Upon the bank becoming insolvent it was held that the board of
education was entitled to a preference over the general creditors to the
full amount of the deposit, and this preference was to be satisfied out
of all of the property of the bank. This holding is now generally considered to be taking property which rightfully belongs to the general
creditors and giving it to an individual creditor. Professor Ames has
the following to say of it: 16 "If the product of the true owner's res
is still traceable in the assets of the wrongdoer, in the form of land,
chattels, a bank deposit, or the money of a bank, its surrender to the
true owner is eminently just. The creditors are left just where they
would be if there had been no misappropriation. If the true owner's
res was used in paying one of the creditors, the frue owner may fairly
claim to be subrogated to that creditor's claim, in which case, also, the
dividends of the other creditors would not be affected by the misappropriation. The same result is reached if, without subrogation, the
true owner is allowed to prove ratably, with the other creditors. But
to go further and give the true owner a preference over all the general creditors means an unfair reduction of the dividend of the other
creditors."
This minority holding has been quite generally discredited by the
courts throughout the country, and even many of the states in which
12 Fire & Water Com'rs. v. Wilkinson, op. cit. supra note 10; Vincent Grain
Co. v. Docking, 124 Kan. 391, 260 Pac. 610 (1927), aff'd, 125 Kan. 383, 265

Pac. 38 (1928); Walker v. First State Bank, 33 N. M. 565, 273 Pac. 764 (1928).
13 Board of Com'rs. of Crawford County, Ohio, v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49, 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907); Andrew v. State Bank, 205 Iowa
1064, 217 N. W. 437, 56 A. L. R. 806 (1928). See, also: James Roscoe (Bolton),
Limited v. Winder [1915] 1 Ch. 62; AmEs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 421.
14 Davenport Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa 722, 45 N. W. 1049 (1890);
Meyers v. Board of Education, 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658, 37 Am. St. Rep. 263
(1893); The I. X. L. Pressed Brick Co. v. Schoeneich, 65 Mo. App. 283 (1895);
McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173 (1886).
15 Op. cit. supra note 14.
16 Am~s, op. cit. supra note 4, at 423.
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it gained its foothold have repudiated it. Professor Bogert says: 17
"But the latest cases in Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, and Wisconsin have either completely abandoned the 'swelling
assets' theory and accepted the 'specific property' rule, or have so
modified and limited the 'swelling assets' doctrine as to make it differ
from the opposing rule only in words."
With the above views in mind let us return to a consideration of
our two original cases. The problem before us is to determine whether
these cases fall within the class where trust money is wrongfully mixed
with other trust money and the fund at all times remains greater than
the amount of trust money wrongfully mixed; or whether they fall
within the class where the trustee's estate has received some general
benefit but the trust money cannot be traced into any particular piece
of property or fund. The reasoning adopted by the Pennsylvania court
seems to be properly open to the criticism that there was no particular
trust res to which a trust could attach. The mere crediting of a miscellaneous account could hardly be considered as an adequate substitute for setting aside a particular amount of money as a trust fund.
Neither was there a chose in action which could be considered as the
trust res, because the bank could not owe itself money. It is difficult
to look upon the crediting of the riscellaneous account as anything
other than a mere bookkeeping transaction. As stated in the dissenting opinion,18 "The opinion of the court in this case.., runs counter
to the rule that has been in force in this state for many years, viz.,
that a trust creditor, in order to secure a preference over general
creditors--and still more, over creditors preferred by statute, such as
depositors of a bank-must trace the fund claimed into some specific
property, fund, securify, or account of the insolvent bank, which has
passed into the hands of the receiver, and the proceeds of which are
being distributed. And by 'account' in that connection is not meant
a mere bookkeeping entry on its own books, but a separate and distinct asset, which is not commingled with the general assets of the insolvent bank, such as an account in another bank, or in the hands of
a third person, or, if an account. on its own books, that specific assets
or property have been set aside for its payment or protection."
If the crediting of the miscellaneous account is not considered as
a sufficient setting aside of money to create a trust there would seem
to be no material distinction between this Pennsylvania case and
Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour & Feed Co.,19 decided in the Federal
court. In both cases the bank had assumed the duty of collecting
money for a customer. The person from whom the money was to be collected had a deposit in the bank, or, in other words, was a creditor of the
bank. Instead of collecting the money in cash the bank merely charged
17
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18 Op.

cit. supra note 1, at 55.

19 Op. cit. supra note 2.
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